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necessary probing questions and pro-
viding key guidance.
These issues are especially salient now,
as the United States contemplates un-
dertaking military operations that
would have profound strategic and po-
litical implications, and when indica-
tions of significant differences exist
between civilian and military leaders
concerning strategy and objectives, be it
against terrorism or militant Islam.
Eliot Cohen is professor of strategic
studies at the School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. A prolific author on strategy, he
has served on the Office of the Secretary
of Defense policy planning staff and is
currently a member of the Defense Pol-
icy Board, advising the secretary of de-
fense. Supreme Command is a must read
for the highest civilian and military
leadership and should also rank high on
military professional reading lists.
JAN VAN TOL
Captain, U.S. Navy
Bacevich, Andrew J., and Eliot A. Cohen, eds.
War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global
Age. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2001.
223pp. $22.50
During the 1999 Nato-U.S. war against
Serbia over Kosovo, an unprecedented
number of strategic and defense think-
ers published their opinions on what
became known as Operation ALLIED
FORCE. Most thought and comment at
the time was extremely critical of the
Clinton administration’s efforts to for-
mulate and execute the operation.
Critics bemoaned a warfighting policy
that appeared pointed in the direction
of a new Vietnam, focusing on gradual
escalation of air strikes without the
threat of ground forces. In the end, the
Nato coalition forces appeared victori-
ous but weighted with the indefinite
mission of peacekeeping in that trou-
bled and violent province. The leader of
the Serbian effort, Slobodan Milosevic,
ended up on trial for war crimes at the
Hague. The leader of the Nato-U.S.
armed forces, General Wesley Clarke,
left his post shortly after the victory un-
der circumstances that looked at the
time like a relief for cause. In late sum-
mer 2002, Nato soldiers continued their
frustrating mission of keeping ethni-
cally divided Kosovars from killing each
other—welcome to “Victory,” post–
Cold War style. While such behavior
and commentary seem unusual, the real
issue is this: does the 1999 Kosovo
“war” provide a signpost for future
conflicts in the early twenty-first cen-
tury, or is that conflict an aberration
best relegated to discussions among
armchair warriors comfortably fortified
with vintage brandy?
In their book War over Kosovo, Bace-
vich, Cohen, and their contributors
make compelling arguments that the
Kosovo War is a signpost, a cautionary
tale of the extent and limits of post–
Cold War superpower politics. Besides
the articles by the editors, the contribu-
tions are by William Arkin, James
Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Alberto Coll, and
Michael Vickers.
Readers should note well that this is a
book with an attitude. Its articles, uni-
formly excellent and insightful, accept,
even embrace, controversy. Given the
nature of the war, such a position for
the book should seem normal.
William Arkin’s lead article, summariz-
ing the history of the conflict, should
become the standard for historians and
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strategists seeking to understand the
war in some form less than book size.
Arkin advises readers not to be deceived
by appearances or Powerpoint briefings
on just what decided victory for the
Nato allies. The article certainly should
replace the disingenuous official
Kosovo report by the secretary of de-
fense used in the curriculum of the
Naval War College and other service
schools.
However, the Arkin piece is only the
appetizer. There is insufficient room to
highlight all the fine articles in this re-
view, but two struck this reviewer be-
tween the eyes. In the first, Anatol
Lieven warns American “hawks” not to
believe Kosovo is a model for future
wars but that the conflict “will persuade
. . . adversaries to confront the West in-
directly, using nonstate actors.” This
was written before 11 September 2002.
Lieven points out that the chaotic, de-
centralized, and violent nature of likely
future conflict environments, including
Afghanistan, can negate the high-
technology advantages of the West,
forcing the fighting down to earth on
conditions more to the liking of the en-
emy. Reading Lieven, and then watch-
ing General Tommy Franks tell U.S.
troops in Afghanistan that the war will
be a long one, made this reviewer’s
hands cold and sweaty. In the second
article, Andrew Bacevich conducts a re-
visionist tour de force describing the
evolution of the Clausewitzian “re-
markable trinity” as it applies to the
United States, focusing especially on the
latest changes effected by the Clinton
administration and first demonstrated
in Kosovo. At the risk of simplification,
Bacevich would have the current trinity
composed of a globally involved gov-
ernment able to use a professional, not
conscript, armed force wherever it
wants in face of an uninterested public—
as long as the conflict is quick and
bloodless. Whether or not one agrees
with Bacevich’s premise and findings,
the power and flow of the author’s con-
ceptualization is truly impressive.
This is a necessary book for those who
teach and practice national security.
The writing and thinking are deep and
compelling. One must congratulate the
editors for their selections. One also
must hope that defense decision mak-
ers, as well as students who will form
the next generation of leadership, will
read and pay serious attention to the
works in this book.
JON CZARNECKI
Associate Professor of Joint Maritime Operations
Naval War College, Monterey Program
Locher, James R., III. Victory on the Potomac.
College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002.
507pp. $34.95
Jim Locher describes the history of the
intense bureaucratic struggle to rede-
sign relationships between the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, secretary of defense, the presi-
dent, and Congress. The prolonged
struggle culminated in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986. This document is
thought by many to be the most sweep-
ing military reform of the last forty
years. Senators Barry Goldwater and
Sam Nunn believed the system was bro-
ken and consequently was providing
low-quality military advice to the
secretary of defense. Others, particu-
larly the service chiefs and the secretary
of defense, strongly disagreed with this
assessment. Victory on the Potomac
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